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A revolution is underway in end-of-life care. Just what it is and
where it is going, like most revolutions, will only become clear with
the benefit of hindsight. Perhaps it will lead to the legalization of
actively hastening death - what is commonly referred to as physician-
assisted suicide, or even to mercy killing - and if not, it may lead to
an increased willingness on the part of some physicians to engage in
these practices covertly, though still illegally.
It is definitely heading toward new medical practices, new laws,
and new societal attitudes in end-of-life care, and one of the most no-
table areas in which this is happening is pain control.' In clinical
medical practice, there is more of it, and its quality is improving.2 In
law, there is increasing statutory and judicial activity to remove barri-
ers to effective pain control.3 There are also increasing efforts to
make hospice care more readily available. 4 There is diminished toler-
ance by terminally ill patients and their families for dying in pain.5
And there is improved education of doctors and medical students
about ways to improve the quality of end-of-life care.6 Nonetheless,
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1. See generally INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, APPROACHING DEATH: IMPROVING CARE AT THE
END-OF-LIFE (Marilyn J. Field & Christine K. Cassel eds., National Academy Press 1997);
Phebe Saunders Haugen, Pain Relief for the Dying: The Unwelcome Intervention of the Criminal
Law, 23 WM. MITCHELL L. REv. 325 (1997).
2. See discussion of physician assisted suicide infra notes 61-74 and accompanying text.
3. See discussion of states which have enacted palliative care statutes infta notes 25-26
and accompanying text.
4. See Quality Hospice Care, COURIER J., June 1, 1998, at 6A.
5. A National Hospice Organization-Gallup Survey found that one of the greatest
fears people have when thinking about dying is pain. See Hospice Is Alternative to Doctor-
Assisted Suicide, THE COLUMBUS DISPATCH, July 29, 1998, at 10A.
6. See AMA to Educate U.S. Physicians on Caring for Dying Patients, U.S. NEWS WIRE,
March 16, 1997. See also Mary ChrisJaklevic, End of Life Training" N.Y. Med. Schools to Join on
Improving Palliative Care, MODERN HEALTH CARE, Aug. 18, 1997, at 32.
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complaints about undertreated severe pain in the terminally ill
persist.7
An important focus, if not the central focus, in the debate about
the changing nature of end-of-life care has been the role of physi-
cians.' This is ironic; the focus should be patients, but that is emblem-
atic of the problem - that we have not been practicing patient-
centered end-of-life care. Physicians are not the only health care pro-
fessionals that have played or will play a role in end-of-life care.
Nurses, visiting nurses, inhalation therapists, nutritionists, clinical
pharmacists in tertiary care settings, and retail pharmacists also have
important roles to play - often more important than physicians do.
This article discusses the legal concerns of pharmacists in end-of-life
care. Specifically, the article focuses on the role of pharmacists in the
prescription of medication to control pain in terminally ill patients
and to carry out physician-assisted suicide.
BACKGROUND
The beginning of public debates about end-of-life care could be
marked by many events, though all would be arbitrary to some degree.
I usually prefer to begin with the Karen Quinlan case in 1976,' but
one could just as logically begin with the debate about brain death in
the mid- to late-1960s,1 ° or the debate about letting handicapped new-
born infants die,11 or a number of other events having to do with end-
of-life decisionmaking, but for present purposes, even the Quinlan
case may be too far back.
In December 1989, the United States Supreme Court heard oral
arguments in the case of Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Department of
Health.2 Despite the proliferation of similar cases around the country
7. Studies and accounts of undertreated pain are legion. Two of the more significant
are The SUPPORT Principal Investigators, A Controlled Trial to Improve Care For Seriously Ill
Hospitalized Patients, 274 JAMA 1591 (1995); AD Hoc COMMITTEE ON PAIN MANAGEMENT,
BREAKING DOWN THE BARRIERS TO EFEcTvE PAIN MANAGEMENT: RECOMMENDATIONS TO IM-
PROVE THE ASSESSMENT AND TREATMENT OF PAIN IN NEW YORK STATE: REPORT TO THE COM-
MISSIONER OF HEALTH (January 1998).
8. See generally Haugen, supra note 1.
9. See In re Quinlan, 355 A-2d 647 (N.J. 1976) (holding that a decision by a young
woman to terminate by natural forces her noncognitive, vegetative existence was a part of
her right to privacy which could be asserted on her behalf by her guardian).
10. See A Definition of Irreversible Coma: Report of the Ad Hoc Committee of the Harvard Medi-
cal School to Examine the Definition of Brain Death, 205 JAMA 85 (1968).
11. See Anthony Shaw, Dilemmas of "Informed Consent" in Children, 289 NEW ENG. J. MED.
885 (1973); see also Raymond S. Duff & A.G. Campbell, Moral and Ethical Dilemmas in the
Special-Care Nursery, 289 NEW ENG. J. MED. 890 (1973).
12. 497 U.S. 261 (1990).
[VOL. 2:211
1999] PAIN CONTROL
in the 15 years since Quinlan, this was the first case the Court had
agreed to review. 3 Months passed, and still the Court had not
handed down a decision. Cruzan was one of the longest-pending cases
on the Court's docket. And then along came a Michigan pathologist,
whom few had ever heard of except those who watched the Donahue
show, Jack Kevorkian, who stole the Court's thunder by assisting a wo-
man in ending her life with his suicide machine. 4 Suddenly, the
terms of the debate about end-of-life care took a quantum leap from
Cruzan's focus on the legal niceties of terminating medically provided
artificial nutrition and hydration to the morality and legality of physi-
cian-assisted suicide. 15
Although Kevorkian refocused our attention on physician-assisted
suicide, he did not introduce this debate; there had been a number of
precursors over the preceding decade or more.' 6 What he did was to
13. The Supreme Court had previously denied certiorari in five right-to-die cases. See
Drabick v. Drabick, 245 Cal. Rptr.2d 840 (Ct. App.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 958 (1988), reh'g
denied, 488 U.S. 1024 (1989); In reEstate of Prange, 520 N.E.2d 946 (Ill. App. Ct.), vacated
sub nom. Murphy v. Chicago Volunteer Legal Serv. Found., 527 N.E.2d 303 (Ill.), cert. denied
sub nom. Murphy v. Benson, 488 U.S. 892 (1988); In reJobes, 529 A.2d 434 (N.J. 1987),
reconsideration and stay denied, 531 A.2d 1360 (N.J. 1987), stay denied sub nom. Lincoln Park
Nursing and Convalescent Home v. Kahn, 483 U.S. 1036 (1987); In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d
647 (N.J. 1976); In re Storar, 420 N.E.2d 64 (N.Y. 1981), cert denied, 454 U.S. 858 (1981),
and in a larger number of related cases. See also In re Phillip B., 156 Cal. Rptr. 48 (Ct. App.
1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 949 (1980); In re Infant Doe, No. GU8204-00 (Ind. Cir. Ct.
Monroe County, Apr. 12, 1982), writ of mandamus dismissed sub nom. State ex rel. Infant Doe
v. Baker, No. 482 S. 140 (Ind. May 27, 1982), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 961 (1983); Weber v.
Stony Brook Hosp., 467 N.Y.S.2d 685 (App. Div.) (per curiam), affd, 456 N.E.2d 1186
(N.Y. 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1026 (1983); In re Milton, 505 N.E.2d 255 (Ohio 1987),
cert. denied, 484 U.S. 820 (1987).
14. See Laura Mansnerus, The Suicide and the Doctor, THE N.Y. TIMEs, June 10, 1990, § 4,
at 7.
15. See, e.g., Annette Clark, Autonomy and Death, 71 TUL. L. REv. 45 (1996).
16. See, e.g., It's Over Debbie, 249 JAMA 272 (1988) (physician anonymously claimed to
have administered lethal overdose to terminally ill patient at her request); Timothy E.
Quill, A Case of Individualized Decision Making, 324 NEw ENG. J. MED. 691 (1991) (physician
admitted to having provided terminally ill patient with lethal overdose).
Voluntary active euthanasia of the terminally ill has been an increasingly accepted
medical practice in the Netherlands since 1973, though increasingly subject to legal regula-
tion. Debates about the Dutch experience have spilled over into the American and
international press and professional and scholarly journals. See, e.g., CARLos GOMEZ, REGU-
LATING DEATH: EUTHANASIA AND THE CASE- OF THE NETHERLANDS (1991); Peter Admiraal,
Euthanasia in the Netherlands-Justifiable Euthanasia, 3 IssuEs L. & MED. 361 (1988); Mar-
garet Battin, Voluntary Euthanasia and the Risks of Abuse: Can We Learn Anything ftom the
Netherlands?, 20 L. MED. & HEALTH CARE 133 (1992); M. deWachter, Active Euthanasia in the
Netherlands, 262 JAMA 3316 (1989); Final Report of the Netherlands State Commission on
Euthanasia: An English Summary, 1 BIOETHICS 163 (1987).
Public debate about actively hastening death in the United States dates back to the
turn of the last century. See Ezekiel Emanuel, Euthanasia-Historical, Ethical, and Empiric
Perspectives, 154 ARCHIVES INTERNAL MED. 1890, 1892 (1994) (Physician-assisted suicide and
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move the discussion of physician-assisted suicide from the fringe to
center-stage. This has subsequently led to a mountain of academic,
popular, and professional writing and debate.17 Yet, despite the ex-
tensive public discussion about assisted suicide for almost a decade,
there has been very little discussion about the role that health care
professionals - other than physicians - would play if assisted suicide
were legalized.
One group of health care professionals - besides physicians -
that is likely to be involved in legalized assisted suicide is pharmacists,
who would dispense lethal substances prescribed by physicians."8 The
debate about the legalization of assisted suicide has also served as an
important catalyst to less drastic alternatives, most notably pain con-
trol.19 This, too, implicates pharmacists because an important, if not
the predominant, mechanism of pain control is prescription
medications.2 °
Any barriers that are placed in the way of pharmacists dispensing
medications in accordance with a physician's legitimate prescription
for pain control undermines the rights that patients might have to
receive such medication and interferes with good end-of-life care. In
addition, legal barriers to terminally ill patients receiving adequate
medications for pain control undermine the Supreme Court's reason-
ing about the constitutionality of state statutes making assisted suicide
a crime and could lead the Court to reconsider its decisions. Finally,
legal barriers to the dispensing of medications for patients to use in
physician-assisted suicide, where it is legal, interferes with this right as
well.21
I. THE RIGHT TO PAIN CONTROL
Over the past few years, a concrete right of terminally ill patients
to adequate pain control has gradually begun to emerge, first from
state legislation and later from decisions of the United States Supreme
active euthanasia have been debated throughout history, and as recently as the end of the
nineteenth century, "had become a topic of speeches at medical meetings and editorials in
British and American medical journals.").
17. See supra note 16.
18. See generally William Allen & David Brushwood, Pharmaceutically Assisted Death and the
Pharmacists' Right of Conscience, 5 J. PHARMAcY & L. 1 (1996).
19. See id.
20. See id.
21. Currently, Oregon is the only state that has legalized physician assisted suicide. See
OR. REv. STAT. § 127.800-897 (1998).
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Court.2 2 Previously, there were no express prohibitions on physicians
providing adequate pain control to patients - terminally ill or other-
wise suffering from pain - but many physicians, whether reasonably
or not, feared possible adverse legal consequences that might ensue
from the prescription of the kinds of medications - not just
analgesics, but sedatives and tranquilizers - often needed by termi-
nally ill patients or by nonterminally ill patients in chronic pain.
In fact, not just physicians but pharmacists - and other health
care professionals who prescribe or administer prescription medica-
tions - are potentially subject to a variety of criminal, civil, and ad-
ministrative penalties. Pharmacists are subject to professional
discipline, including revocation or suspension of their license, for im-
properly dispensing such medications; they can lose their registration
with the federal Drug Enforcement Administration to dispense con-
trolled substances,23 which include most of the medications used for
the treatment of severe pain and related conditions; they are subject
to criminal liability for violation of the federal Controlled Substances
Act;24 and because the medications used for the treatment of severe
pain have the potential for causing the patient's death, they may be
subject to criminal, civil, and administrative proceedings if a patient
dies or is injured from taking a prescription medication.
A. State Palliative Care Statutes
A gradually increasing number - now about 40 percent - of
states have enacted statutes25 intended to assist patients in receiving
22. This is most recently evidenced by Justice O'Connor's concurrence in Washington v.
Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 702 (1997).
23. See 21 U.S.C. §824 (1999). For a thorough description of the registration process
by which physicians become entitled to prescribe and pharmacists to dispense controlled
substances, see Douglas J. Behr, Prescription Drug Control Under the Federal Controlled Substances
Act: A Web of Administrative, Civil, and Criminal Law Controls, 45 WASH. U. J. URBAN & CON-
TEMP. L. 41, 53-58 (1994). See also DouglasJ. Pisano, Controlled Substances and Pain Manage-
ment: Regulatory, Oversight, Formularies, and Cost Decisions, 24J. L. MED. & ETHics 310 passim
(1996).
24. See 21 U.S.C. §841(a)(1) (1999). See generally Behr, supra note 23, at 66-117.
25. In addition, some other states have adopted administrative rules or guidelines. See,
e.g., LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §37:1285.2 (1998) (establishing state Board of Medicine Advisory
Committee on Pain to make recommendations to board on law reform about the use of
prescription medications for treatment of pain); WASH. REv. STAT. ANN. §18.130.340
(1999) (directing state Secretary of Health to work with health professional regulatory
boards and commissions to develop opiate therapy guidelines for treatment of terminal
and intractable conditions). See Ann M. Martino, In Search of a New Ethic for Treating Patients
with Chronic Pain: What Can Medical Boards Do?, 26 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 332, 332 (1998)
("Between 1997 and 1998, thirty states enacted laws adopting administrative rules, and/or
established guidelines for the use of narcotic analgesics for the treatment of chronic
pain.") (citing D.E. Joranson & A.M. Gilston, State Intractable Pain Policy: Current Status, 7
1999]
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adequate palliative care, including adequate doses of appropriate
medications for pain control.26 These statutes were enacted to over-
come physicians' reluctance to use powerful medications to treat pain
because of their fear that the medications might hasten or cause the
patient's death, thereby subjecting the prescribing physician to legal
liability.
2 7
There are actually two different kinds of statutory provisions.
One type is usually labeled an "intractable pain act." These statutes
authorize physicians to use medications to treat intractable pain, and
they confer immunity from disciplinary action by state licensing au-
thorities if the medication hastens or causes the patient's death.28
The second type is an amendment to the state's statute making aiding
21suicide a crime, which confers immunity from criminal prosecution
APS Bulletin 7-9 (no. 2, 1997)). See also CHOICE IN DYING, RIGHT TO DIE LAW DIGEST, State
Laws Regarding Intractable Pain (Sept. 1998).
26. See CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §2241.5 (West 1998); CAL. HEALTH & SArETY CODE
§§124960, 124961 (West 1998); CoLo. REV. STAT. ANN. §12-36-117(1.5) (West 1998); FLA.
STAT. ANN. §458.326(3) (West 1998); IND. CODE. ANN. §35-42-1-2.5 (West 1998); IowA CODE
ANN. §707A.3; Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. §216.304 (Michie 1998); MICH. COMP. LAws ANN.
§§752.1027, 333.5658; MINN. STAT. ANN. §609.215(3)(a) (West 1998); Mo. ANN. STAT.
§§334.105-.107 (West 1998); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. §§630.3066, 633.521 (Michie 1996);
N.D. CENT. CODE §§19-01.3-01-06; OHIO REv. CODE ANN. §§2133.11, 2133.12 (Anderson
1998); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §4731.052 (Anderson 1997); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63,
§3141.4; OR. REV. STAT. §§677.470-.485 (1997); R-I. GEN. LAWS §11-604 (1998); R.I. GEN.
LAWS §§5-37.4-1-.4-3; S.D. CODIFIED LAWS §22-16-37.1 (Michie 1998); TENN. CODE ANN. §39-
13-216(b)(2) (Michie 1997); TEX. REv. Crv. STAT. ANN. ART. 4495(c) (West 1999); VA.
CODE ANN. §54.1-3408.1 (Michie 1998); VA. CODE ANN. §8.01-622.1(E) (Michie 1998);
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §69.50.308; W. VA. CODE §§30-3A-1-3 (1999). See generally Sandra H.
Johnson, Disciplinary Actions and Pain Relief: Analysis of the Pain Relief Act, 24 J.L. MED. &
ETHICS 319 (1996).
27. See generally Johnson, supra note 26. See also Ann Alpers, Criminal Act or Palliative
Care? Prosecutions Involving the Care of the Dying, 26J. LAw MED. & ETHICS 308 (1998).
28. See, e.g., CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 2241.5; COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-36-117 (1.5);
MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. §§752.1027, 333.5658; MINN. STAT. ANN. §609.215(3) (a); Mo. ANN.
STAT. §§334.105-.107; NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. §§630.3066, 633.521; N.D. CENT. CODE §§19-
03.3-01-06; OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§2133.11(A)(6), 2133.12(E)(1), 4731.052; OR. REv.
STAT. ANN. §§677.470- .485; R.I. GEN. LAWS §§5-37.4-1-3; TEX. REv. CIV. STAT. ANN. ART.
4495(c); W. VA. STAT. ANN. §30-3A-2.
29. See, e.g., IND. STAT. ANN. §3542-1-2.5; IOWA CODE ANN. §707A.3; Ky. REv. STAT. ANN.
§216.304; MICH. COMp. LAWS ANN. §§752.1027, 333.5658; MINN. STAT. ANN. §609.215(3) (a);
OHIO REv. CODE ANN. §§2133.11 (A) (6), 2133.12(E)(1); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, §3141.4;
R.I. GEN. LAWS §11-60-2; S.D. CODIFIED LAws ANN. §22-16-37.1; TENN. CODE ANN. §39-13-
216; W. VA. STAT. ANN. §§30-3A-2.
Virginia has a provision of its Drug Control Act dealing with this issue. See VA. CODE
ANN. §54.1-3408.1. This provision states that a physician who in good faith prescribes an
"excess dosage" of a pain relieving agent for the treatment of intractable pain is not in
violation of the act. Id. However, it continues, "[n]othing in this section shall be con-
strued to grant any person immunity from investigatory or disciplinary action based on the
prescription, dispensing or administration of an excess dosage in violation of this tide." Id.
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if, as a result of the treatment of intractable pain, the physician has-
tens or causes the patient's death - what I refer to as "double effect"
provisions. For convenience, I will refer to both types of statutes col-
lectively as "palliative care statutes."
The enactment of palliative care statutes constitutes legislative
recognition of the principle of double effect in end-of-life medical
care. That is, these statutes recognize that if the intended effect of
providing palliative care is the legitimate one of treating a patient's
symptoms, but an unintended (though foreseeable) effect also occurs
- namely, the palliative care causes the patient's death - the actor is
exempt from legal consequences.3 °
1. Scope of Protection
One problem with the palliative care statutes is that they confer
significantly different protections on physicians. 3' The intractable
pain statutes provide immunity from state licensing board disciplinary
action. 32 Theoretically, the physician is still subject to prosecution for
assisted suicide in states in which assisted suicide is a criminal offense
- which is most states - or for homicide. 3' The physician may also
be subject to tort liability for wrongful death.
The double effect provisions exempt physicians from criminal lia-
bility if the patient dies as a result of being treated for intractable
pain.3 4 However, in theory, the physician is still subject to disciplinary
action by state licensing authorities and to wrongful death actions.
The West Virginia statute provides protection against both criminal
prosecution and administrative proceedings, 36 and four other states
Thus, it appears to provide only immunity from prosecution for drug offenses but ex-
pressly not for disciplinary actions nor implicitly for other criminal offenses or civil actions.
Virginia also has a statute intended to prevent suicide by creating a statutory basis for
obtaining injunctive relief against any person who is believed to be about to aid another in
committing suicide, but it does not apply to licensed health care practitioners who pre-
scribe or dispense medications to relieve pain. See VA. CODE ANN. §8.01-622.1(E).
Aiding suicide is a distinct crime in most states. See AiAN MEISEL, THE RIGHT To DIE,
§18.17, at 344-45 (Supp. 1999) (Tbl. 18-1).
30. See 1 ALAN MEISEL, THE RIGHT To DIE, §8.7 (2d ed. 1995).
31. See Martino, supra note 25.
32. See Chris Stern Hyman, Pain Management and Disciplinary Action: How Medical Boards
Can Remove Barriers to Effective Treatment, 24J. LAw MED. & ETHICS 338, 340 (1996) (noting
that six states have enacted statutes that offer protection from disciplinary action with lan-
guage, such as California's, that no physician and surgeon shall be subject to disciplinary
action by the board for prescribing or administering controlled substances in the course of
treatment of a person for intractable pain).
33. See MEISEL, supra note 29, at 344-45 (Tbl. 18-1).
34. See Alpers, supra note 27, at 318-20.
35. See id.
36. See W. VA. STAT. ANN. §§30-3A-2(a).
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do so because they have both types of statutes. 7 Only two states also
provide protection against civil liability.38 Of course, none of the stat-
utes do or could confer liability against violations of federal law, and
thus physicians are still subject to criminal and administrative penal-
ties for violation of the federal Controlled Substances Act.39
It is difficult to know what is the magnitude of risk of investiga-
tion or prosecution of a physician for homicide when a patient dies
who has been prescribed large doses of pain control medications.
Most instances of investigation or prosecution do not result in a re-
ported appellate case, and thus obtaining accurate data is virtually im-
possible.4" However, this is an area where perception probably
37. See MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§752.1027, 333.5658; MINN. STAT. ANN. §609.215(3)
(a); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§2133.11 (A) (6), 2133.12(E) (1), 4731.052; R.I. GEN. LAWS §§5-
37.4-1 -3.
38. See MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§752.1027, 333.5658; OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§2133.11
(A) (6), 2133.12(E) (1), 4731.052.
39. 21 U.S.C.A. §801 et seq. (1998). See, e.g., W. VA. STAT. ANN. §30-3A-2(c) ("Nothing in
this article shall prohibit disciplinary action or criminal prosecution of a . . .pharmacist
for: (1) Administering or dispensing a controlled substance in violation of the provisions of
the federal Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970 ...").
There are other problems with the protection purportedly conferred by palliative
care statutes. The Institute of Medicine identified the following:
1. [These statutes] do not, in all cases, mark a clear area of medical practice in
which physicians feel free to manage their patients' pain. The more specific
laws, for example those that set out detailed prescription practices, may actu-
ally afford physicians less leeway in the practice of medicine. Additionally, by
carving out an area of pain treatment that is immune from medical board
discipline, there may be an implication that other forms of pain treatment
should be subject to disciplinary review.
2. Even the strongest intractable pain law is still limited by the term intractable.
Many cases are ambiguous, and physicians may believe that they must delay
opioid treatment until pain is far enough along to be called intractable.
3. An additional problem arises when state laws define addition without regard
to pain management. As noted earlier, California defines addicts as "habitual
users," which might include patients taking opioids for chronic pain. Such
confusing definitions . . . expose physicians to the threat of medical board
discipline.
4. Finally, the legal affirmations in these laws of the importance of pain control
do not, in themselves, correct practice patterns or improve physician training.
Laws could, however, encourage patients to expect diligence in pain relief,
including use of generally effective medications. Medical boards could con-
sider disciplining physicians who fail to apply proven methods of pain
control.
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(M.J. FIELD & C.K. CASSEL eds., 1997).
40. See generally Alpers, supra note 27, at 308 (Tbl. 1, at 312-13, reporting criminal inves-
tigations of physicians; Thl. 2, at 313-14, reporting criminal trials of physicians). But see
Haugen, supra note 1, at 353 ("[N]o physician in the United States has ever been convicted
of murder or assisted suicide for providing a patient with high doses of medication for pain
relief." (citing Melissa L. Buchan & Susan W. Tolle, Pain Relieffor Dying Persons: Dealing with
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matters more than reality.41 An occasional news report of an investi-
gation or prosecution of a physician - or a pharmacist or a nurse -
may have a strong impact on other health care professionals, with the
lasting message that it is better to err on the side of being conservative
in the prescribing and dispensing of pain control medications.4 2 In
addition, even if physicians are not subject to criminal prosecutions in
such situations, they may be cited for violations of state licensing laws
and regulations and federal drug control laws.4" Even if violations of
such laws are ultimately not proved, in the meantime, a physician can
incur substantial financial costs, embarrassment and bad publicity,
and possible temporary suspension of a license to practice medicine
or registration to prescribe controlled substances. 44
2. Applicability to Pharmacists
Palliative care statutes were enacted largely to allay physicians'
fears of incurring adverse legal consequences from the use of medica-
tions intended to treat severe pain. In most instances in which physi-
cians prescribe medications for legitimate palliative purposes, a
pharmacist will dispense the medication, and thus the question arises
of whether or not palliative care statutes provide protection to phar-
macists too.
4 5
At the threshold, we must ask what it is for which pharmacists
might need protection. A pharmacist could conceivably be subject to
liability for assisted suicide (or possibly homicide) if a patient commit-
ted suicide using a medication prescribed by a physician for pain con-
trol and dispensed by the pharmacist. However, the possibility of
criminal liability seems extremely remote. For there to be liability for
Physicians'Fears and Concerns, 6J. CLINICAL ETHICS 53, 53 (1995)); Leonard H. Glantz, With-
holding and Withdrawing Treatment: The Role of the Criminal Law, 15 LAW MED. & HEALTH
CARE 231, 238-40 (1987); Sidney H. Wanzer et al., The Physician's Responsibility to Hopelessly
Ill Patients, 310 NEw ENG. J. MED. 955, 956 (1984).
41. See generally Martino, supra note 25.
42. See id.
43. See generally RICHARD R. ABOOD & DAVID B. BRUSHWOOD, PHARMACY PRACTICE AND
THE LAW chs. 3 & 6 (1994).
44. See 21 U.S.C.A. §823(b), (e) (West 1998);Johnson, supra note 26. See generally Mar-
tino, supra note 25.
45. A model pain relief act specifically includes pharmacists within its definition of
health care provider. See Project on Legal Constraints on Access to Effective Pain Relief,
The Pain Relief Act, 24J. LAw, MED. & ETHICS 317, 317 (1996). The National Legal Center
for the Medically Dependent & Disabled, Inc., drafted model legislation stating that "[a]
licensed pharmacist... may dispense medical means of suicide to a person who the phar-
macist reasonably believes presents a valid prescription for such means." See National
Center for the Medically Dependent and Disabled, Inc., A Model State Act to Authorize and
Regulate Physician-Assisted Suicide, 13 IssuES IN LAw & MED. 219, 223 (1997).
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assisted suicide under the Model Penal Code, among other things, the
actor must "purposely aid[ ] . . .another to commit suicide .... 46
Rare would be the pharmacist who possesses sufficient facts about the
patient to meet this scienter requirement.47
In a jurisdiction in which physician-assisted suicide is not legal, it
is likely that if a physician is going to aid the patient in ending his life,
the physician will take considerable pains to be sure that his complic-
ity will not be apparent. For example, the physician may insinuate
that the patient could gradually build up a lethal supply of a pre-
scribed medication. Although the pharmacist plays a role in the pa-
tient's death by dispensing the medication, it is an altogether
unwitting one if the prescription, on its face, gives no hint of the fact
that the patient intends eventually to use it to kill himself. In other
cases of patient suicide, the physician will not even be aware of the
patient's intent to use medications prescribed for pain control to end
his life. This would make criminal liability on the part of the pharma-
cist an even more remote possibility. The same is true of tort liability
for intentionally causing the patient's death. In addition, in such
cases, courts have usually concluded that the patient's conduct in
committing suicide is a superseding cause that cuts off any liability the
pharmacist might otherwise have had.4"
A pharmacist could also conceivably be subject to criminal or tort
liability for negligently causing the death of a patient being treated for
intractable pain if the pain medication accidentally caused the pa-
tient's death. Proof of negligence would be far simpler than proof of
intent. However, establishing that a pharmacist owes a duty, the
breach of which is actionable, to warn patients of the lethality of a
drug taken in excess of what is prescribed is highly problematic.49
46. MODEL PENAL CODE §210.5(2) (1980).
47. Under the Model Penal Code:
A person acts purposely with respect to a material element of an offense:
(i) if the element involves the nature of his conduct or a result thereof, it is
his conscious objective to engage in conduct of that nature or to cause
such a result; and
(ii) if the element involves the attendant circumstances, he is aware of the
existence of such circumstances or he believes or hopes that they exist.
MODEL PENAL CODE §2.02 (1980).
48. See, e.g., Speer v. United States, 512 F. Supp. 670, 679 (N.D. Tex. 1981) (finding
pharmacist negligent for failure to monitor patient's prescriptions which patient hoarded
and used to commit suicide, but holding that this negligence was not a proximate cause of
harm to the patient). See generally W.E. Shipley, Annotation, Druggist's Civil Liability for
Suicide Consummated with Drugs Furnished by Him, 58 A.L.R.3d 828 (1975).
49. See, e.g., Kampe v. Howard Stark Prof'l Pharmacy, Inc., 841 S.W.2d 223, 226 (Mo.
Ct. App. 1992) (holding the pharmacist's responsibility applies to dispensing controlled
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Pharmacists may also be subject to administrative proceedings, re-
sulting in suspension or revocation of their license to practice phar-
macy, if a patient dies or is injured as a result of an excessive dosage of
medication. Pharmacists generally are subject to professional disci-
pline for a conviction of a felony,5 ° so in the unlikely event that a
pharmacist is convicted of intentional or accidental criminal homicide
or aiding suicide from an excessive dose of pain medication, this
could also form the basis for disciplinary proceedings. Even in the
absence of a criminal conviction, pharmacists are subject to profes-
sional discipline for unprofessional conduct as a result of dispensing
practices.5 1 Finally, pharmacists might be subject to criminal or civil
penalties for the violation of federal or state statutes regulating con-
trolled substances.52
We can only begin to answer the question of whether palliative
care statutes provide protection to pharmacists against these myriad
possible sanctions by looking at the exact language of the statutes, and
of course we find that they are worded in various ways and that some
are clearer than others in this regard. Only the West Virginia statute
specifically addresses applicability to pharmacists.53 It provides that
"[a] registered pharmacist shall not be subject to disciplinary sanc-
tions by a licensing board or criminal punishment by the state for dis-
pensing a prescription for a pain-relieving controlled substance to
alleviate or control intractable pain, if dispensed in accordance with
the orders of a licensed physician."54 A few palliative care statutes ex-
substances, not providing advice on their use). See generally Mitchell Waldman, 25 AM. JUR.
2D Drugs and Controlled Substances §236 (1996).
50. See ABOOD & BRUSHWOOD, supra note 43. Furthermore,
[n]early all pharmacy practice acts contain catchall phrases that can snare unsus-
pecting pharmacists who follow the letter, but not the spirit, of the law. Terms
such as 'unprofessional conduct' and 'moral turpitude' can serve as the basis for a
successful disciplinary proceeding, even if the pharmacist involved has disobeyed
no specific legal requirement.
Id, at 176.
51. See generally Vitauts M. Gulbis, Annotation, Wrongful or Excessive Prescription of Drugs
as Grounds for Revocation or Suspension of Physician's orDentist's License to Practice, 22 A.L.R.4th
668 (1981). Minnesota has enacted a statute specifically providing that a pharmacist's li-
cense may be denied, suspended, or revoked if he or she is found to have aided or at-
tempted to aid in a suicide in violation of the state's assisted suicide statute. See MINN.
STAT. §151.06(7)(xiii) (1998).
52. See, e.g., 21 U.S.C. §841(a) (1) (West 1998). See generally Behr, supra note 23, at 66-
117.
53. SeeW. VA. STAT. ANN. § 30-3A-3(b) (1).
54. Id. However, the statute also states that "[niothing in this article shall prohibit
disciplinary action or criminal prosecution of a ... pharmacist for: (1) Administering or
dispensing a controlled substance in violation of the provisions of the Federal Comprehen-
sive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970." Id.
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pressly provide protection to "health care professionals" or a "licensed
health care provider" and then define that term to include pharma-
cists.55 Others, such as Indiana's, contain no definition of health care
provider.56 However, it is reasonable to assume that the statutory term
"health care provider" includes pharmacists. 7
Other statutes might cover pharmacists but do not do so ex-
pressly. For example, the provision in a few palliative care statutes
that any "person". "who prescribes, dispenses or administers an excess
dosage in accordance with this section shall not be in violation of the
provisions of this title" certainly includes pharmacists. 58 Some statutes
include dispensing medications within the scope of a physician's statu-
torily protected activities, 59 and these might also support a claim for
the inclusion of pharmacists among those who are protected by the
statutes.
Finally, even in the absence of express or tacit statutory language,
a claim can be made on the basis of policy that pharmacists should be
protected under the remainder of the statutes because pharmacists
are an ordinary, and often necessary,60 part of the process of dispens-
ing medication, and the primary interest sought to be protected by
the statute - assuring adequate analgesia and sedation for terminally
ill patients - would be undermined if only physicians were accorded
statutory protection but not pharmacists and all other necessary per-
sons in the chain of prescribing, dispensing, and administering the
medications.
In sum, current state legislation provides uneven and incomplete
protection to pharmacists. One of the most obvious shortcomings is
that it does not - and cannot - confer protection against federal
offenses.
55. See, e.g., IowA CODE ANN. §707A.1 (West 1998); IND. CODE ANN. §35-42-1-2.5
(Michie 1998); Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. §216.300 (Michie 1998); MINN. STAT. ANN. §609.215
(3)(a) (West 1998); R.I. GEN. LAws §11-60-2 (1997); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. §22-16-37.7
(Michie 1998).
56. See IND. CODE ANN. §35-42-1-2.5 (Michie 1998).
57. Some of the statutes that do define health care professionals specifically include
pharmacists. See, e.g., Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. §216.300 (Michie 1998); MINN. STAT. ANN.
§609.215(3) (a) (West 1998); R.I. GEN. LAws §11-60-2 (1997); S.D. CODIFIED LAWs ANN. §22-
16-37.7 (Michie 1998).
58. See VA. CODE ANN. §54.1-3408.1. Accord MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. §752.1027; TENN.
CODE ANN. §39-13-216.
59. See Mo. ANN. STAT. §334.106(1); OHIO REa. CODE ANN. §§2133.11-.12; R.I. GEN.
LAws §5-37.4-3; VA. CODE ANN. §54.1-3408.1.




B. United States Supreme Court Decisions
Two United States Supreme Court cases, having little on their
face to do with palliative care, may turn out to be critically important
to the development of the law in this area. Washington v. Glucksberge
and Vacco v. Quill2 commenced as actions to declare unconstitutional
and enjoin the further enforcement of, respectively, the Washington
and New York state statutes making aiding suicide a criminal offense,
at least when the person doing the aiding was a licensed physician and
the person receiving the aid was terminally ill.63 The Supreme Court's
narrow holdings in these cases are that neither the Fourteenth
Amendment's due process clause nor the equal protection clause in-
validate these state statutes.6 4 However, the cases do much more.
They might establish a constitutional right to palliative care; they rec-
ognize the legitimacy of the principle of double effect; and they seem-
ingly recognize that states are constitutionally permitted to legalize
physician-assisted suicide.
1. Constitutional Right to Palliative Care
If state palliative care statutes do not cover the waterfront - and
there are still many states that do not have one, and in others it is
unclear whether they apply to pharmacists - then the Supreme
Court's decisions in the physician-assisted suicide cases should assure
a right to palliative care. The Glucksberg and Vacco decisions are
strongly grounded in the assumption that physician-assisted suicide is
not needed because there are no legal barriers to obtaining adequate
palliative care. Although the Court did not hold, or even state, that
states are constitutionally prohibited from constructing barriers to ob-
taining medication for pain relief,65 if such barriers did exist, this
might be one of the situations in which the Chief Justice's majority
61. 521 U.S. 702 (1997).
62. 521 U.S. 793 (1997).
63. See Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 702; Vacco, 521 U.S. at 793.
64. See Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 706; Vacco, 521 U.S. at 797.
65. However, Justice Breyer in concurrence was more specific:
[T]he laws before us do not force a dying person to undergo that kind of pain
.... Were the legal circumstances different-for example, were state law to pre-
vent the provision of palliative care, including the administration of drugs as
needed to avoid pain at the end of life-then the law's impact upon serious and
otherwise unavoidable physical pain (accompanying death) would be more di-
rectly at issue. And asJustice O'Connor suggests, the Court might have to revisit
its conclusions in these cases.
Vacco, 521 U.S. at 791-92 (Breyer, J., concurring).
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opinions stated that the Court would have to revisit the question of
the constitutionality of state laws that criminalize assisted suicide.66
Second, a majority of the Justices - especially Justices O'Connor,
Ginsburg, and Breyer, but also Justices Stevens and Souter - issued
concurring opinions that went significantly beyond the Chief Justice's
narrow opinion for the Court. As Professor Robert Burt has observed,
all, in their own way, can be viewed as providing substantial support
for the existence of a constitutional right to palliative care.67 This
should also create a strong incentive for opponents of the legalization
of physician-assisted suicide to work to be certain that legal barriers to
obtaining adequate palliative care do not exist, for if they do, one of
the foundations of the Court's holdings will crumble.
2. Supreme Court's Recognition of Principle of Double Effect
One need not go as far as Professor Burt does, for it is certain
that Supreme Court decisions recognize the legitimacy of the doctrine
of double effect.6" In Vacco, the Court lumped death resulting from
66. That is, such barriers to palliative care might be what the Court envisioned in the
last footnote of each case that would cause the Court to reconsider the constitutionality of
state prohibitions on physician-assisted suicide. See Glucksburg, 521 U.S. at 735 n.24; Vacco,
521 U.S. at 809 n.13.
67. See Robert A. Burt, The Supreme Court Speaks - Not Assisted Suicide But a Constitutional
Right to Palliative Care, 337 NEw ENG. J. MED. 1234, 1235 (1997). He states that:
[T]hree Justices (O'Connor, Ginsburg, and Breyer) specifically concluded that
judicial intervention would become necessary, as Justice Breyer put it, "were state
law to prevent the provision of palliative care, including the administration of
drugs as needed to avoid pain at the end of life." An additional two justices (Sou-
ter and Stevens) mentioned this issue as one among other problems afflicting
terminally ill people that, if not adequately addressed by state legislatures, would
require future judicial intervention.
Id.
68. See Vacco v. Quill, 521 U.S. 793, 802-03 (1997).
The law has long used actor's intent or purpose to distinguish between two acts
that may have the same purpose or result. The law distinguishes between actions
taken "because of" their intended end and actions taken "in spite of" their unin-
tended but foreseen consequences.
Id. See also John D. Arras et al., Introduction to JOHN D. ARRAS & BONNIE STEINBOCK, ETHI-
CAL ISSUES IN MODERN MEDICINE 21 (John D. Arras & Bonnie Steinbock eds., Mayfield Pub-
lishing Company 1993).
The doctrine of double effect (DDE) was formulated in response to the recogni-
tion that an act may have both a good and a bad effect... For example adminis-
tering morphine to a dying cancer patient may be necessary to relieve his or her
pain, but it may also depress respiration and hasten death. Must a doctor refrain
from using the most effective pain medication because it might also kill the pa-
tient? Would this count as doing evil (causing death) that good (relieving pain)
may come? ...The physician's purpose is not to kill, but rather easing pain,
although he or she foresees that death is a possible, or even likely, result. Giving
drugs for pain relief is not intrinsically wrong; indeed it is a central function of
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an unintentional overdose of pain relief medication with the accepta-
ble practices of withholding and withdrawing treatment, and distin-
guished them from actively hastening death:
[A] physician who withdraws, or honors a patient's refusal to
begin, life-sustaining medical treatment purposefully in-
tends, or may so intend, only to respect his patient's wishes
and "to cease doing useless and futile or degrading things to
the patient when [the patient] no longer stands to benefit
from them." [Citation omitted]. The same is true when a
doctor provides aggressive palliative care; in some cases,
painkilling drugs may hasten a patient's death, but the physi-
cian's purpose and intent is, or may be, only to ease his pa-
tient's pain. A doctor who assists a suicide, however, "must,
necessarily and indubitably, intend primarily that the patient
be made dead."6"
And in Glucksberg, the Court more pointedly stated that:
The purpose of requesting and giving the medication is pre-
sumably not to cause death but to relieve the pain so that the
State's interest in preserving life is not unequivocally impli-
cated by the practice; and the importance of pain relief is so
clear that there is less likelihood that relieving pain would
run counter to what a responsible patient would choose,
even with the consequences for life expectancy.7"
These are clear statements of the Supreme Court's acceptance of the
legitimacy of double effect and its imprimatur on the use of adequate
medications for pain control even if they inadvertently accelerate or
even cause death.
3. Supreme Court's Recognition That States May Legalize Physician-
Assisted Suicide
The Supreme Court also recognized, though obliquely, that the
Constitution does not bar physician-assisted suicide, and thus a state
may choose to legalize it, as has been done in Oregon7" and unsuc-
the physician. The good effect-the relief of pain-is produced by the bad effect,
namely the patient's death. And lastly when a patient is both terminally ill and
suffering, the desirability of relieving suffering compensates for the shortening of
his or her life. Thus, DDE can be a useful tool for justifying an action that has a
bad effect.
Id.
69. Vacco, 521 U.S. at 802 (quoting Assisted Suicide in the United States, Before the Subcomm.
On the Constitution of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 1 0 4 ' Cong., 2d Sess., 368 (1996)
(testimony of Dr. Leon R. Kass)).
70. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 784 n.16 (Souter, J., concurring).
71. See OR. REv. STAT. §§127.800-.897 (1997).
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cessfully attempted in other states.72 Thus, the Supreme Court proba-
bly granted Oregon a right to legalize physician-assisted suicide, a
conclusion supported by the Court's denial of certiorari in Lee v. Har-
cleroad, the case dismissing the injunction against the implementation
of Oregon's voter initiative legalizing physician-assisted suicide.73 If
states may legalize the use of medications for the purpose of inten-
tionally hastening a patient's death, certainly physicians should not be
prohibited from using legitimate prescription medications for the less
drastic purpose of pain control merely because their use risks causing
death.
72. See Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 735 (stating that "[t]hroughout the Nation, Americans
are engaged in an earnest and profound debate about the morality, legality, and practical-
ity of physician-assisted suicide. Our holding permits this debate to continue, as it should
in a democratic society."). See also id. at 788-89 (Souter, J., concurring); id. at 738-52 (Ste-
vens, J., concurring). The consensus among scholars is that the Court did leave it up to
each state to decide for itself how to address the concerns over physician-assisted suicide.
See, e.g., Benjamin C. Zipursky, Physician-Assisted Suicide: Right and Risk to Vulnerable Commu-
nity, 24 Fo .DLi-" URB. L. J. 777, 777 (1997); Susan Frelich Appleton, Assisted Suicide and
Reproductive Freedom: Exploring Some Connections, 76 WAsH. U. L. Q. 15, 31 (1998).
73. 118 S. Ct. 328 (1997), denying cert. to Lee v. Oregon, 107 F.3d 1382 (9,h Cir. 1997),
revg Lee v. Oregon, 891 F. Supp. 1429 (D. Or. 1995). A provision of the Oregon statute
provides that:
No health care provider shall be under any duty, whether by contract, by statute
or by any other legal requirement to participate in the provision to a qualified
patient of medication to end his or her life in a humane and dignified manner. If
a health care provider is unable or unwilling to carry out a patient's request
under ORS 127.800 to 127.897, and the patient transfers his or her care to a new
health care provider, the prior health care provider shall transfer, upon request, a
copy of the patient's relevant medical records to the new health care provider.
ORE. REv. STAT. §§127.885(2), (4).
The applicability of this provision to pharmacists is unclear. The threshold question is
whether a pharmacist is a "health care provider" as that term is used with the statute. The
Death with Dignity act defines "health care provider" as:
a person licensed, certified, or otherwise authorized or permitted by the law of
this State to administer health care in the ordinary course of business or practice
of a profession, and includes a health care facility.
Id. §127.800(5), thereby begging the question.
The provisions of the Oregon statutes dealing with the licensing of pharmacists do not
make it clear whether or not pharmacists are to be considered "health care providers" or
whether the practice of pharmacy is "health care." However, it is certainly a reasonable
assumption that they do. See, e.g., ORE. REV. STAT. §689.025(2) (1997) (stating that the
purpose of the act is to promote the public's health and welfare through the regulation of
drugs "used in the diagnosis and treatment of injury, illness and disease.").
Second, the second sentence of § 127.885(4) dealing with the transfer of medical
records makes it seem as if the entire subsection is intended to apply to physicians and




II. PHARMACISTS' CONCERNS ABOUT THE LEGALIZATION OF
PHYSICIN-AssISTED SUICIDE
If pharmacists could be subjected to legal penalties - criminal,
civil, or administrative - based on their dispensing medications in
accordance with a physician's legitimate prescription for palliative
care, it would render a patient's right to adequate palliative care a
nullity. Logic dictates that if it is legal for a physician to prescribe
medication for palliative care, it must be legitimate for a pharmacist to
dispense it. Thus, state palliative care statutes must be construed by
courts and administrative agencies - and probably should be clari-
fied by legislatures - to apply to pharmacists' dispensing of medica-
tions prescribed by physicians as well as to physicians' prescription
practices. Similarly, to the extent that the United States Supreme
Court's decisions rejecting a constitutional right to physician-assisted
suicide can be viewed as creating a constitutional right to palliative
care, this right must also extend to pharmacists' dispensing as well as
physicians' prescribing.
That much ought to be uncontroversial. What is more controver-
sial are the concerns of pharmacists arising from the legalization of
physician-assisted suicide. The right to physician-assisted suicide,
where it has been legalized, would be undermined if pharmacists
could be penalized for filling a legal prescription for a medication
intended for such use. Thus, as with the dispensing of medications
for palliative care, logic again dictates that if it is legal for a physician
to prescribe medication for physician-assisted suicide, it must be legal
for a pharmacist to dispense it. As a starting point, that might be cor-
rect, but as with most things, it's more complicated than that.
Oregon is the only state to have legalized physician-assisted sui-
cide, although similar efforts have been made in other states, both
before and after Oregon's actions."4 It did so through a voter initia-
tive in 1994, leading to the enactment of the Oregon Death with Dig-
nity Act 7" by a margin of 51 to 49 percent.76 The implementation of
this act was promptly enjoined by a federal district court.77 The in-
junction remained in place for almost three years.78 It was not lifted
74. See generally Arthur A. Povelones, Jr., When the Majority Says You May Die: Aid-in-Dying
Initiatives, 9 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'y 537 (1995).
75. See OR. REv. STAT. §127.800 et seq. (1996).
76. See Povelones, supra note 74, at 550 n.65.
77. See Lee v. Oregon, 891 F. Supp. 1429 (D. Or. 1995), vacated and remanded for lack of
standing, 107 F.3d 1382 (9th Cir. 1997), cert. denied sub. nom. Lee v. Harcleroad, 118 S. Ct.
328 (1997).
78. See Lee, 107 F.3d at 1386.
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until after the United States Supreme Court had ruled in the two phy-
sician-assisted suicide cases.79 By that time, efforts were underway in
Oregon to repeal the original initiative through a second initiative.8"
However, this effort failed by a margin of 60 to 40 percent in the No-
vember 1997 election.8 1 As of the end of 1998, Oregon officials re-
ported that physicians had prescribed a lethal dose of medication to
terminally ill patients on 23 occasions, and 15 patients actually died
from the prescribed overdose, six died naturally before being able to
take the medications, and two were still alive at the time of the
report.
82
Although failing at the state level to repeal the legalization of
physician-assisted suicide, opponents still hold out hope at the federal
level. Shortly after Oregon voters reaffirmed their commitment to the
legalization of physician-assisted suicide in the November 1997 elec-
tion, the director of the United States Drug Enforcement Administra-
tion (DEA) ruled that it would be a violation of the federal Controlled
Substances Act for any physician, including those in Oregon, to dis-
pense controlled substances for the purpose of aiding a patient in
ending his own life.83 However, the DEA director neglected to con-
sult with his superior, Attorney General Reno, who commenced a
study of the action and concluded that the DEA director had not ac-
ted in keeping with the Congressional purpose in enacting the Con-
trolled Substances Act - to prevent trafficking in illegal drugs and
abuse of legitimate drugs.84 She then concluded that the Controlled
Substances Act did not support the ban on the use of legitimate drugs
for an approved medical purpose.85
In reaction to the Attorney General's decision, legislation known
as the Lethal Drug Abuse Prevention Act was introduced in the House
and the Senate to block the use of controlled substances for use in
79. See id.
80. See Timothy Egan, In Oregon, Opening a New Front in the World of Medicine, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 6, 1997, at A26.
81. See id.; Gail Kinsey Hill, Suicide Law Stands, PORTLAND OREGONIAN, Nov. 5, 1997, at
Al.
82. See Arthur E. Chin et al., Legalized Physician-Assisted Suicide in Oregon - The First Year's
Experience, 340 NEw ENG.J. MED. 577 (1999); Oregon Health Division, Oregon's Death with
Dignity Act: The First Year's Experience (visited Feb. 18, 1999) <http://www.ohd.hr.state.or.
us/cdpe/chs/pas/ar-index.htm>.
83. See DEA Could Take Action Against Oregon Physicians, Constantine Says, BNA HEALTH
G. DAILY, Nov. 13, 1997, at D6.
84. See DEA Won't Sanction Oregon Physicians Who Participate in Lawful Assisted Suicides, 7




physician-assisted suicide, euthanasia, or mercy killing. s6 The Senate
version of the bill states that "the dispensing or distribution of con-
trolled substances to assist suicide is not a legitimate medical purpose
and should not be construed to be permissible under the Controlled
Substances Act."'87 However, prominent opponents of physician-as-
sisted suicide, including Oregon's Governor Kitzhaber and Senator
Wyden, opposed federal intervention to impede the Oregon statute,
whether by the DEA or by federal legislation.88
Although the bills acknowledge that use of controlled substances
for the treatment of pain is a legitimate use under the Controlled Sub-
stances Act,89 even some opponents of physician-assisted suicide fear
that the legislation will seriously harm the efforts to make pain control
medications available to those who legitimately need them.9" The
principal objection to the proposed legislation is that it would deter
physicians from aggressively prescribing pain medication for termi-
nally ill patients because of their fear that inadvertent patient deaths
could cost doctors their DEA registration, needed for prescribing con-
trolled substances.91 The American Medical Association, one of the
most outspoken and influential organizations on record as opposing
the legalization of physician-assisted suicide, concurred in the opposi-
tion to federal intervention. 2
The proposed legislation would also burden pharmacists, who
would be forced to distinguish between prescriptions intended for
pain relief and prescriptions intended for use in physician-assisted sui-
86. See S. 2151, 105th Cong. (1998); H.R. 4006, 105th Cong. (1998).
87. S. 2151, at §2.
88. See Erin Hoover Barnett, Congress to Open up Debate on Assisted Suicide, PORTLAND
OREGONIAN, July 9, 1998, at Bi; Jim Barnett, Utah Senator Vows to Fight Oregon's Law, PORT-
LAND OREGONAN, Nov. 10, 1997, at Al.
89. See S. 2151, §2(a)(4); H.R. 4006, §2(b) (i) (B).
90. See AMA, Pharmacists Blast Bill to Block Physician-Assisted Suicide, MED. & HEALTH, July
20, 1998 (reporting over 30 organizations expressed opposition to the measure, including
the American Pharmaceutical Association and American Society of Health Systems
Pharmacists).
91. See Dave Hogan & Jim Barnett, House Panel Votes to Block Suicide Law, PORTLAND
OREGONIAN, Aug. 5, 1998, at Al; see alsoJohnson, supra note 26, at 320:
Doctors' fears of disciplinary action and criminal prosecution are justified. There
is no evidence that the large numbers of physicians are sanctioned for their treat-
ment of patients in pain, but the impact of the process on those physicians who
are only investigated, or only charged but not disciplined, or only warned or cau-
tioned but not penalized is severe.
Id.
92. See Diane M. Gianelli, Aid Suicide, Lose DEA License, AM. MED. NEws, July 27, 1998, at
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cide cases.93 This, and the burden placed on physicians, would ulti-
mately redound to the disadvantage not merely of patients seeking
controlled substances for physician-assisted suicide but the much
larger group of patients - both terminally ill and nonterminally ill -
who need these medications for the relief of serious pain.94
A. Pharmacists' Need to Know the Purpose of a Prescription
In November 1997, after the second referendum to legalize physi-
cian-assisted suicide, the Oregon Board of Pharmacy adopted a tem-
porary rule stating that:
a prescription issued pursuant to the Oregon Death with
Dignity Act shall be in writing and signed by the physician
with the words 'This prescription is pursuant to ORS 127.800
- 127.897' on the face of the prescription. 9
Why the Board did so is not entirely clear. It might have been a legiti-
mate effort to provide pharmacists with information they believed
they needed to appropriately fill prescriptions, or it might have been
an attempted end run by the Pharmacy Board around the Death with
Dignity Act.
Although this rule has been withdrawn, some pharmacists still
contend that they need to know if a prescription is intended to be
used for physician-assisted suicide.96 Further, enactment of legislation
like the federal Lethal Drug Abuse Prevention Act9 7 would also create
a need for physicians to have this information. There are a number of
arguably legitimate reasons why pharmacists need to know that a par-
93. See Physician-Assisted Suicide Bill Would Require Pharmacies to "Guess" Intended Use of
Substances, Risking Pharmacies' DEA Registration If Guess is Wrong, NHO Says, HEATiH NEws
DAILY, Aug. 21, 1998, available in 1998 WL 9315046.
94. See id.
95. OR. ADMIN R. 855-041-0065 (Nov. 14, 1997). A few months later, a lawsuit com-
menced by the Oregon Medical Association challenging the validity of this rule. See Patrick
O'Neill, Physicians Appeal Rule on Suicide Medicines, PORTLAND OREGONIAN, Jan. 9. 1998, at
DI. This suit was settled, and the Pharmacy Board's rule was replaced by a Board of Medi-
cal Examiners' rule requiring that physicians who prescribe medications pursuant to the
Death with Dignity Act either dispense the medications themselves if the physician is regis-
tered as a dispensing physician with the Board, or "with the patient's consent" inform the
pharmacist of the purpose of the prescription. OR. ADMIN R. 847-015-0035 (final review,
July 17, 1998) (on file with Journal of Health Care Law & Policy). The rule does not state
what is to occur if the patient refuses consent to release of this information to the
pharmacist.
96. See Michael T. Rupp & Holly L. Isenhower, Pharmacists' Attitudes Toward Physician-
Assisted Suicide, 51 Am. J. Hosp. PHAjc. 69, 73 (1994).
97. S. 2151, 105th Cong. (1998); H.R. 4006, 105th Cong. (1998).
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ticular prescription is intended to be used by a patient pursuant to the
physician-assisted suicide statute. 8
1. Counseling Patients
One such reason is so that the pharmacist can properly dispense
and label the prescription and properly counsel the patient (or the
patient's caregiver) about the prescription's use, whether the medica-
tion is intended for the relief of pain or for physician-assisted suicide.
Because many medications can be used for either purpose, pharma-
cists need to be able to protect patients who are using the medication
for some medical purpose other than committing suicide. A physician
might prescribe a medication for a patient for pain control that could
also be used for assisted suicide. If the physician were to make an
error in the dosage that inadvertently made the prescription lethal,
the pharmacist would only be able to alert the physician or the patient
to the error if he knew the prescription's purpose. If the pharmacist
incorrectly assumed that the prescription was intended for hastening
the patient's death and filled the prescription, a tragic error could
occur. In other words, the pharmacist can only know if the prescrip-
tion is correct if he knows the prescription's intended purpose. On
the other hand, if the purpose of the prescription is to end the pa-
tient's life, pharmacists may need to know that too in order to give
proper counsel as to how to use the medication. 99
Pharmacists have legal obligations to counsel patients.100 The
traditional common-law obligation is somewhat attenuated, uncertain,
and even conflicting, °1 but in the last two decades it has begun to
develop into a more robust obligation to warn patients of a variety of
kinds of things that can go wrong from the medications dispensed by
a pharmacist. °2 Furthermore, there are federal statutory obligations
98. Fifty-four percent of pharmacists would want to know if a prescription was intended
for assisted suicide. See Rupp & Isenhower, supra note 96, at 71.
99. See O'Neill, Pharmacy Board Requires Notification, PORTLAND OREGONIAN, Nov. 7,
1997, at A14 ("Pharmacists who want to help with suicides say notification will let them
better counsel patients on how to use the medication.").
100. See infta notes 103-04 and accompanying text.
101. See, e.g., Jones v. Irvin, 602 F. Supp. 399, 402 (S.D. Ill. 1985) (holding pharmacist
has no duty to warn patient or notify physician that patient is being over-medicated or that
drugs could cause adverse reactions, placing duty on physician to ascertain correct dosages
and combinations of drugs). See generally DavidJ. Marchitelli, Annotation, Liability of Phar-
macist Who Accurately Fills Prescription for Harm Resulting to User, 44 A.L.R. 5th 393, 393 (1996)
("In most cases, courts have taken a position ... that a pharmacist has no duty to warn a
customer of the risk of harm that might be encouraged from drugs which are accurately
dispensed upon a valid and legal prescription.").
102. See Allen & Brushwood, supra note 18, at 4.
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to counsel patients, t °03 and some states have similar statutory obliga-
tions.10 4 In the context of physician-assisted suicide, this obligation
means, as one Oregon Pharmacy Board member explained, "if they're
going to take a large dose of barbiturates, they need to take it very
rapidly because of the possibility that they'd fall asleep before they
finished it.''1° 5
2. Avoiding Liability
Closely related to the first reason for wishing to know if the pur-
pose of a prescription is for assisted suicide is pharmacists' and phar-
macy owners' fears that they will incur civil liability if a prescription
for assisted suicide fails and injures the patient." 6 This concern is
probably without substantial legal basis. Although there is not a great
deal of law on the subject, what there is suggests that pharmacists do
not have a duty to warn a patient that a medication is inappropriate or
ineffective.107
103. See Pharmaceutical Access and Prudent Purchasing Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. §1396r-8
(g) (2) (A) (ii) (I) (1991). The Act requires pharmacists to "offer to discuss" matters that in
the pharmacist's professional judgement are significant, including:
" The name and description of the medication.
• The route, dosage form, dosage, route of administration, and duration of
drug therapy.
* Special directions and precautions for preparation, administration and use by
the patient.
" Common severe side or adverse effects, or interactions and therapeutic con-
traindications that may be encountered, including their avoidance, and the
action required if they occur.
Id. §1396r-8(g) (2) (A) (ii) (I) (aa)-(dd). See generally Michael J. Holleran, The Pharmaceutical
Access and Prudent Purchase Act of 1990: Federal Law Shifts the Duty to Warn from the Physician to
the Pharmacist, 26 AKRON L. REv. 77 (1992). This legislative mandate has been furthered
through the efforts of the Food and Drug Administration. See Allen & Brushwood, supra
note 18, at 4 n.5 (citing David A. Kessler, A Challenge for American Pharmacists: The FDA
Commissioner Challenges Pharmacists to Renew Their Commitment to Patient Education, 23 AM.
PHARm. 33 (1992)).
104. See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §20-620 (West 1998) (applying only to Medicare pa-
tients); GA. CODE ANN. §26-4-85 (Harrison 1998); IDAHO CODE §54-179 (1998); ME. REV.
STAT. ANN. tit. 32 §13784 (West 1998); NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. §71-1, 147.35(2)(a) (Michie
1998); N.D. CENT. CODE §43-15-31.2 (1998); S.C. CODE ANN. §40-43-86(L) (1) (Law Co-op
1998); S.D. CODIFIED LAws §36-11-68 (Michie 1998); UTAH CODE ANN. §58-17a-612 (1998).
Cf W. VA. CODE §30-5-5a (1998) (creating profession of licensed pharmacy technician to
enable pharmacists to counsel patients).
105. O'Neill, supra note 99, at A14.
106. See Michael Slevak, Suicide Law Divides Oregon R.Phs., 215 AM. DRUGGIST 11, 19
(1998) (reporting that both moral and legal concerns would prevent pharmacists from
filling such prescriptions).
107. See, e.g., Wimm v.Jack Eckerd Corp., 3 F.3d 137 (5th Cir. 1993) (affirming a district
court ruling that pharmacist has no duty to warn where drug prescribed for patient is
inappropriate for patient's condition); Speer v. United States, 512 F. Supp. 670 (N.D. Tex.
1981) (finding pharmacist negligent for failure to monitor patient's prescriptions which
PAIN CONTROL
Pharmacists may also be concerned about incurring liability to
patients for whom controlled substances are prescribed for the treat-
ment of serious pain rather than for physician-assisted suicide, but
who die from the ingestion of the medication. As previously dis-
cussed, there is little risk of liability if the patient intentionally com-
mits suicide or if the patient accidentally dies from an overdose of the
medication.1 °8
3. Conscientious Objection
Some pharmacists wish to know whether a prescription is in-
tended to be used in physician-assisted suicide because of their consci-
entiously held objections to participating in - even legalized -
assisted suicide.1 °9 Although conscientious objection to participation
in the provision of health care services is a well-accepted concept, es-
pecially in the area of reproductive services (abortion, contraception,
and sterilization) and to a somewhat lesser extent in the forgoing
(withholding or withdrawing) of life-sustaining treatment, the full ex-
tent of its legal status and scope are uncertain.
The concept of conscientious objection to providing certain types
of medical treatment achieved prominence and acceptance during
the bitter abortion debate beginning with Roe v. Wade,11 a topic at
least equal in terms of the level of controversy it engenders to physi-
cian-assisted suicide. A majority of the states have adopted conscience
clause legislation covering abortion.111 These statutes provide that
the refusal to participate in abortion services - and sometimes in pro-
viding other reproductive services - does not, as New Jersey's statute
states, "constitute grounds for civil or criminal liability, disciplinary ac-
tion or discriminatory treatment."' 12
The vast majority of state conscience clause statutes apply only to
abortion (or other reproductive services) and thus do not include per-
sons who choose to exercise this right in the context of physician-as-
patient hoarded and used to commit suicide, but holding that this negligence was not the
proximate cause of harm to the patient); Marchitelli, supra note 101, at 393.
108. See supra notes 23 and 24 and accompanying text.
109. See Michael F. Conlan, Pharmacists Share Divergent Views on Assisted Suicide Issue, 141
DRUG Topics 86 (1997). According to 1995 Survey of Oregon State Pharmacists Associa-
tion by Oregon State University College of Pharmacy, "49% of responding pharmacists said
they would not participate professionally in physician-assisted suicide, while 36% of phar-
macists said they would." Id.
110. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
111. See Lynn D. Wardle, Protecting the Rights of Conscience of Health Care Providers, 14 J.
LEGAL MED. 177, 178 (1993).
112. N.J. STAT. ANN. §2A: 65A-3 (West 1998).
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sisted suicide.11 However, a small number of states have statutes that
provide a general right of conscientious objection to health care per-
sonnel that could be construed to include physician-assisted sui-
cide. 1 4 And at least one statute specifically includes euthanasia." 15
However, this statute only applies to health care personnel working in
hospitals, and then only if the opposition to performing euthanasia or
another specified health service is based on "the dogmatic or moral
beliefs of any well established religious body or denomination.
' 16
Most conscience clauses for abortion do not specifically apply to
pharmacists."1 7 This results from the fact that when enacted, most
abortions were surgically performed, and thus applied only to those
who would be called upon to participate in surgery." 8s To date, only
South Dakota has enacted legislation conferring a right of conscien-
tious objection for pharmacists faced with a prescription to actively
hasten a patient's death."' The driving force behind this legislation
was the lobbying of pro-life advocates opposed to physician-assisted
suicide. 2 ° The South Dakota statute states that "[n]o pharmacist may
be required to dispense medication if there is reason to believe that
the medication would be used to ... [c]ause the death of any person
by means of an assisted suicide, euthanasia, or mercy killing."' 2 ' The
statute further provides that "[n]o such refusal to dispense medica-
tion pursuant to this section may be the basis for any claim for dam-
ages against the pharmacist or the pharmacy of the pharmacist or the
basis for any disciplinary, recriminatory, or discriminatory action
against the pharmacist." 2
2
113. See Wardle, supra note 111, at 179.
114. See, e.g., ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. ch. 745 §70/4 (West 1998) (providing immunity
from liability to "health care personnel" who refuse to participate in "any particular form
of health care service which is contrary to the conscience"); N.Y. EDuc. LAW §6527(4) (c)
(McKinney 1998) (permitting physicians to refuse to perform any professional service to
which they are conscientiously opposed); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §48.43.065(2) (a) (West
1998) (providing protection from discrimination in employment or professional privileges
to any individual health care provider who refrains from providing service by reason of
conscience).
115. See N.J. STAT. ANN. §30:11-9 (West 1998).
116. Id.; see also Wardle, supra note 111, at 177; Allen & Brushwood, supra note 18, at 13.
117. See Wardle, supra note 111, at 184.
118. See David B. Brushwood, Conscientious Objection and Abortifacient Drugs, 15 CuNIcAL
THERAPEUTICS 204, 208 (1993).
119. See S.D. CODIFIED LAws §36-11-70 (Michie 1998).
120. SeeJulie Brienza, State Law Protects 'Conscientious Objector'Druggists, TRIAL, Aug. 1998,
at 86 (summarizing the provisions of the new South Dakota law) (interview with Terri
McEntaffer, executive director of the South Dakota Pharmacists Association).




Oregon's Death with Dignity Act contains a general conscience
clause stating that "[n]o professional organization or association, or
health care provider, may subject a person to censure, discipline, sus-
pension, loss of license, loss of privileges, loss of membership or other
penalty for participating or refusing to participate in good faith com-
pliance with ORS 127.800 to 127.897. '123 Pharmacists are undoubt-
edly covered by this clause with respect to the designated types of
organizations that might seek to penalize them for their refusal to dis-
pense a prescription for physician-assisted suicide. However, it is un-
clear whether retail pharmacies are subsumed within the term "health
care provider," the only statutory term that could conceivably apply.1 24
The official position of the American Pharmaceutical Associa-
tion (APhA) "recognizes the individual pharmacist's right to ex-
ercise conscientious refusal and supports the establishment
of systems to ensure patient access to legally prescribed thera-
py without compromising the pharmacist's right of conscien-
tious refusal." 125  The APhA resolution also recognizes the
right of patients to have legal prescriptions filled by pharma-
cists who are willing to do so. 126 In other words, the APhA's posi-
tion tries to strike a balance between competing interests,1 2 1
123. OR. REv. STAT. §127.885(2) (1996).
124. The scope of protection in other state conscientious objection statutes is sometimes
far less clear than that of the state of Oregon. For example, the Illinois statutes provide
immunity from civil and criminal liability, but not from administrative proceedings. See
745 ILL. CoMp. STAT. ANN. §70/4 (West 1998). Also, it almost certainly does not provide
protection against discharge from employers. See id.
By contrast, the South Dakota statute recognizing a right of conscientious objection to
assisted suicide provides far broader protection than merely against liability and seemingly
protects actions taken by employers against employees or even independent contractors.
See S.D. CODIFIED LAws §36-11-70 (Michie 1998). ("No such refusal to dispense medication
pursuant to this section may be the basis for any claim for damages against the pharmacist
or the pharmacy or the basis for any disciplinary, recriminatory, or discriminatory action
against the pharmacist.").
125. See Michael F. Conlan, 7 Object" APhA Endorses Refusal to Dispense on Moral Grounds,
142 DRUG Topics 83, 83 (1998); Diane M. Gianelli, Pharmacists Wary of Assisted Suicide Mea-
sure, Am. MED. NEWS, Oct. 24, 1994, at 17.
126. See Erin Hoover, Pharmacists Accept Right to Legal Lethal Dose, PORTLAND OREGONLAN,
Apr. 18, 1998, at El.
127. See American Pharmaceutical Association, 1997-98 Policy Committee Report: Pharmacist
Conscience Clauses (visited June 2, 1998) <http:/ww2.aphanet.org/APhA/rontest/
committee2.html>:
The Association's policy committee concurred with previous discussion by the
APhA House of Delegates, where the Delegates chose to support the decisions of
individual pharmacists in such situations, rather than prescribing a specific
course of behavior. Such a stand supports the professions' responsibility to the
patient, including respecting the decisions that the patient has made, without
requiring the pharmacist to participate in activities they find objectionable.
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not unlike what courts have tried to do in end-of-life decision-
making.'
28
APhA's efforts to support those pharmacists who have conscien-
tiously held beliefs that they should not participate in physician-as-
sisted suicide, as well as those whose beliefs dictate that they should,
may run into a very practical obstacle posed by the contemporary
structure of the retail pharmacy business. Many, if not most, pharma-
cies are owned by large pharmacy chains, and pharmacists are employ-
ees. 129 Even in smaller chains of pharmacies or individual-pharmacist
owned pharmacies, there are still likely to be pharmacists who are em-
ployees.1a 0 Under these circumstances, there is ample opportunity for
disagreement between owners and individual pharmacists about what
is the morally proper course of action.
Owners may not only disagree with employees but seek to dictate
whether they may or may. not fill a prescription for physician-assisted
suicide."' The scope of coverage of conscientious objection provi-
sions, such as Oregon's, will play a determinative role in resolving
these conflicts. If the statute provides pharmacists with protection
against efforts by employers to pressure them to conform their actions
to the employers' views, they will be able to exercise their right of
conscience. Otherwise, they will probably have to choose between
their conscience and their job.13
Id.
128. Eleven state advance directive statutes expressly permit health care providers to
refuse to implement a living will, health care power of attorney, or both on the basis of
conscience. See Ajuz. REv. STAT. ANN. §36-3205 (West 1998); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16 §2508
(1998); HAW. REv. STAT. ANN. §327D-11 (1995); ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. ch. 755 §§35/6, 45/
4-8 (West 1998); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 18-A §5-807 (West 1998); Miss. CODE ANN. §41-41-
215 (1998); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§137-H:6, 137-J:8 (1998); N.M. STAT. ANN. §24-7A-7
(Michie 1998); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§1337.16, 2133.02 (Anderson 1998); PA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 20, §5409 (West 1998); TENN. CODE ANN. §§24-6-214, 32-11-108 (1998). See generally
MEISEL, supra note 30, at 422-26. However, most state advance directive statutes permit
health care professionals to decline to comply with the provisions of an advance directive.
See Noncompliance Provisions in Statutes, Authorizing Health Care Agents, Noncompliance Provi-
sions in Living Will Statutes, RIGHT-TO-DIE LAw DIGEST (March 1998).
129. See generally Manpower Shortage Lifts Pharmacists' Wages, CHEMIST & DRUGGIST, Apr.
11, 1998, at 31.
130. See, e.g., Melissa Montealagre, Small Pharmacies Fill the Bil4 MONTGOMERY ADVER-
TISER, Feb. 16, 1998, at 6B.
131. See, e.g., Elaine Lafferty, Beware the Counterpunch - What Happens When a Prescription
Offends Pharmacist's Beliefs?, TIME, Apr. 28, 1997, at 66 (reporting drug store reprimanded
pharmacist who refused to fill prescription for abortifacient and store's policy is that "a
pharmacist, if he has moral objections, should refer the prescription to another on-duty
pharmacist .... or to a competing pharmacy, if necessary.").
132. See Allen & Brushwood, supra note 18, at 6-9. In the field of end-of-life decision-
making, there have been a small number of cases in which nurses - who, like pharmacists,
are employees - have objected to following a physician's order, allegedly on grounds of
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If the experience with abortion is any guide, pharmacies, as insti-
tutions, will be able to opt out of filling prescriptions for physician-
assisted suicide. The courts have generally held that there is no obli-
gation on the part of hospitals, unless they are public hospitals, to
offer abortion services.
1 33
Pharmacists who do follow the dictates of their consciences
against dispensing prescriptions intended for physician-assisted sui-
cide are likely to create considerable hardship for some patients, espe-
cially those living in nonurban areas where pharmacists and
pharmacies might not be plentiful. In the case of abortion, finding an
abortion provider can be very difficult, but in most cases patients are
at least mobile.1 34 By contrast, patients seeking medications for physi-
cian-assisted suicide are far more likely to be totally dependent on
their caretakers to obtain their medications for them, and taking care
of a dying person at home can be an extremely onerous process, even
with the support of a hospice program. 135 In many cases, having to
locate and travel to a pharmacy that will dispense a lethal medication
may turn out to be a practical impossibility for either the patient or
the caretaker.1
36
conscience. See Warthen v. Toms River Community Mem'l. Hosp., 488 A.2d 229 (N.J. Sup.
Ct. App. Div. 1985); Farnam v. CRISTA Ministries, 807 P.2d 830 (Wash. 1991); Free v. Holy
Cross Hosp., 505 N.E. 2d 1188 (Ill. App. Ct. 1987). The courts upheld the dismissals of
these nurses. See Warthen, 488 A.2d at 233; Farnam, 807 P.2d at 843; Free, 505 N.E.2d at 1191.
However, the facts of these cases are different enough from each other and, possibly, from
the scenarios that might result in the assertion of conscientious objection by pharmacists,
to draw any conclusions applicable to the instant issue.
With respect to abortion:
[m] any states require objecting pharmacists to notify their employers of their ob-
jection before such a situation arises. The language in conscience clauses varies
greatly from state to state, and the language differences may alter the applicability
of the clauses to pharmacists. In some states, pharmacists may not be included
within the protection of the clause at all. In other states, pharmacists are clearly
included, but the clause applies only in hospitals or clinics.
ABOOD & BRUSHWOOD, supra note 43, at 307.
133. See, e.g., Wolfe v. Schroering, 541 F.2d 523 (6th Cir. 1976).
134. See generally Verena Dobnik, Study Finds Number of U.S. Abortions at Lowest Level in 20
Years: Surveyors Say Number of Providers Also Falls, and Violence by Protestors May Be a Reason,
STAR-LEDGER, Dec. 11, 1998, at 023 (reporting a nationwide drop in the number of abor-
tion providers and, of cities surveyed, one-third have no abortion providers available).
135. See Susan M. Wolf, Pragmatism in the Face of Death: The Role of the Facts in the Assisted
Suicide Debate, 82 MINN. L. REV. 1063, 1076-77 (describing terminal patients as profoundly
dependent on health care professionals for everything from toileting to life-saving care).
136. Hospice programs generally supply patients under their care with medications
from the hospice pharmacy, and thus neither patients nor their caretakers need to bear
the burden of finding a pharmacy that stocks necessary medications or of traveling to the
pharmacist. However, this is not likely to be the case with medications intended to be used
for physician-assisted suicide, which is generally anathema to the philosophy of hospice
care.
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A possible solution is the development of a program to direct pa-
tients who receive prescriptions pursuant to statutes like Oregon's
Death with Dignity Act to pharmacists who would be willing to fill
these prescriptions. 137 Another possibility is increased reliance on
physician dispensing of medications.1 3 8
The problem, in practice, is that permitting pharmacists not to
participate might have the same result in physician-assisted suicide
that permitting physicians and hospitals not to participate has had in
the realm of abortion: there is a right in theory but a very attenuated
one in practice because so many choose not to participate, whether
for reasons of conscience or convenience.
4. Reprisals
A more practical concern of some pharmacists than conscien-
tious objection is that if they dispense prescriptions for medications
intended to be used in physician-assisted suicide and it becomes
known publicly that they do so, they might be subject to reprisals in
the form of harassment, boycotts, picketing, and even violence by op-
ponents of physician-assisted suicide.1 39 These are not fanciful con-
cerns given the history of the actions of opponents to the equally
controversial topic of abortion.14°
137. See Gianelli, supra note 125, at 17 (interview with Susan Winckler, policy and legisla-
tive director of the APhA). Pharmacists for Death with Dignity formed in Oregon in Janu-
ary of 1998, likely in response to the potential need for a program to link pharmacists with
patients. See Hoover, supra note 126, at El.
138. The federal Controlled Substances Act permits physicians to dispense controlled
substances. See 21 U.S.C.S. §802(10) (defining "dispense"); 21 U.S.C.S. §802(21) (defining
"practitioner" to include physicians) (West 1998); 21 C.F.R. §1304.02(d) (defining "indi-
vidual practitioner" to include physicians). Most states also permit physician dispensing,
though often with limitations. See Richard Abood, Physician Dispensing: Issues of Law, Legis-
lation and Social Policy, 14 AM.J. L. & MED. 307, 318-20 (1989); Nat'l Ass'n of Board of Phar-
macy, Survey of Pharmacy Law (visited Jan. 30, 1999) <http://www.nabp.net/whoweare/
publications.asp>. In general, physicians have the right to dispense medications to pa-
tients. See 28 C.J.S. DRUG AND NARcOTICS §39 (1996). The specifics vary and are ordinarily
governed by individual state statutes. See id.
139. See Derek Humphry, Euthanasia Research & Guidance Organization (ERGO),
<righttodie@efn.org>, Nov. 19, 1997 (electronic news listserve) (on file with author).
[O]wners of pharmacies are afraid . .. [t]hat militant right to life groups will
target them in a vociferous and perhaps violent manner. Geoff Sugerman, polit-
ical consultant to Oregon Right to Die, sponsors of the new law, which took effect
October 27, said the Tiffany's owner was well within his rights as a health provider
to refuse to participate under the Act.
Id.
140. See, e.g., O'Neill, Pharmacy Panel Affirms Suicide Disclosure, PORTLAND OREGONIAN,
Nov. 19, 1997 at ElO ("Doctors are worried that their participation in an assisted suicide
might become public. That it could make them the target of protests by assisted-suicide
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As is the case with conscientious objection, individual pharmacists
and pharmacy owners may have different views about the risks that
they wish to take, resulting in conflicts that, in this case, will make it
necessary for pharmacists to choose not between their conscience and
their job but between their personal security and their job.
B. Reasons for Withholding Information from Pharmacists
There are a number of countervailing considerations to pharma-
cists' wishes to know whether a prescription is intended to be used for
physician-assisted suicide. As previously mentioned, the most funda-
mental one is that such knowledge could significantly impede - if
not entirely thwart - patients' access to needed medications, thus un-
dermining their right to assisted suicide.
There are a number of other reasons for not providing pharma-
cists with information about the fact that a prescription is intended to
be used for physician-assisted suicide. Although at first glance, some
of these reasons appear to protect physicians' interests, in fact some
also protect patients' interests in access to medications needed for
physician-assisted suicide because deterrents to physician participa-
tion ultimately redound to the disadvantage of patients who wish a
physician's assistance in ending their lives.
1. Identification of Physicians by the DEA
If prescriptions intended to be used for physician-assisted suicide
were so labeled, it would make it simple for the federal Drug Enforce-
ment Administration (DEA) to identify physicians who participate in
assisted suicide."' If the DEA is hostile to physician-assisted suicide, it
can use this information to scrutinize more thoroughly the controlled-
substances prescribing practices of physicians who participate in as-
sisted suicide, subjecting them to investigations, prosecutions, and the
fear that they will lose their DEA registration to prescribe controlled
substances. 142 If such information comes into the hands of state regu-
latory authorities, doctors may also be subject to state investigation,
with the possibility of having sanctions imposed on their license to
opponents, much in the same was that doctors who perform abortions are targeted by anti-
abortion groups.").
141. See 21 U.S.CA. §822(a)-(b) (West 1998) (requiring every person who manufac-
tures, distributes, or dispenses any controlled substance to register with the U.S. Attorney
General); 21 U.S.C.A. §829 (West 1998) (requiring physicians to write prescriptions for all
controlled substances).
142. See 21 U.S.C.A §824 (West 1998) (authorizing Attorney General to deny, revoke, or
suspend registration required for distribution of controlled substances); 21 U.S.C.A. §822
(f) (authorizing Attorney General to inspect the establishment of a -registrant).
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practice medicine or being subject to criminal prosecution for drug
offenses. 143
Although the current director of the DEA is hostile to legalized
physician-assisted suicide, 44 he has been curbed by a ruling by the
Attorney General that it is not a violation of the federal Controlled
Substances Act for Oregon physicians to prescribe controlled sub-
stances for use in physician-assisted suicide pursuant to the Oregon
statute.1 45 Future administrations may take a different position on
this issue - assuming that federal legislation governing the use of
controlled substances for use in physician-assisted suicide is not en-
acted146 - thereby putting physicians in jeopardy at some later time.
2. Physicians' Privacy and Security
Physicians are not only concerned that their involvement in phy-
sician-assisted suicide could become known to federal and state regu-
lators, they are also concerned that it could become known to virulent
opponents of assisted suicide.147 Taking a lesson from the abortion
wars, like pharmacists, they are concerned about the possibility of har-
assment, boycotts, picketing, and even violence by opponents of physi-
cian-assisted suicide. 4  Thus, those physicians who choose to
participate in physician-assisted suicide may still have a strong interest
in concealing it.
3. Patient Confidentiality
Indicating on a prescription that it is intended to be used for
physician-assisted suicide violates patient confidentiality. In the case
of many prescriptions, pharmacists are able to determine, or to guess
with a fair degree of accuracy, a prescription's intended use. Stating
the intended use on a prescription, however, leaves no room for
doubt. On the other hand, pharmacists' ethics require that they keep
143. See, e.g., MD. REGS. CODE tit. 10, §.03 (requiring registration of manufacturers, dis-
tributors, and dispensers of controlled substances); MD. REGS. CODE tit. 10, §.09 (delineat-
ing states administrative functions, practices, and procedures regarding controlled
substances); MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, §287 (1998) (criminalizing possession or administra-
tion of controlled substance unless obtained pursuant to a "valid" prescription subject to
four years imprisonment and $25,000 fine upon conviction).
144. See DEA Could Take Action Against Oregon Physicians, Constantine Says, supra note 83,
at D6.
145. See DEA Won't Sanction Oregon Physicians Who Participate in Lawful Assisted Suicides,
supra note 84, at 958.
146. See generally Lethal Drug Abuse Prevention Act, S. 2151, 105th Cong. (1998).
147. See Assisted Suicide Foes Invade Hemlock Offices, AM. MED. NEWS, Feb. 9, 1998, at 3.
148. See O'Neill, supra note 140, at El0.
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such information confidential,' 49 and a breach of this obligation is
grounds for professional discipline by the state regulatory board.
1 50
Yet, information about prescriptions is potentially available to persons
other than pharmacists, persons who are not subject to the same pro-
fessional requirements of confidentiality as pharmacists are.' 51
CONCLUSION
The legalization of physician-assisted suicide in Oregon and ef-
forts to legalize it elsewhere will have profound implications for many
health care professionals. Although the focus to date has been on the
implications for physicians, pharmacists also have serious concerns.
Where physician-assisted suicide is legal, the threshold question for
pharmacists will be whether they will dispense a physician's prescrip-
tion for a lethal medication intended to be used by a patient for as-
sisted suicide. Individual pharmacists whose conscience or other
concerns leads them to refuse to do so will potentially face reprisals
from employers and will possibly jeopardize a patient's right to
choose. Pharmacist who do dispense such prescriptions may also
come into conflict with employers who hold opposing views and may
also be subject to conflict with vocal opponents of physician-assisted
suicide. They may also risk liability if a lethal prescription injures a
patient, rather than ending his life.
The movement to legalize physician-assisted suicide has given ad-
ded urgency to the already existing concerns of health care profes-
sionals about improving the quality of palliative care - especially the
use of pain control medications - for the terminally ill. This has
spawned another set of concerns for pharmacists. As long as physi-
cian-assisted suicide remains illegal in most jurisdictions, these matters
will be of far more concern to the overwhelming majority of pharma-
cists than those that arise where physician-assisted suicide is legal. De-
spite the enactment in many jurisdictions of statutes intended to
permit physicians to prescribe and pharmacists to dispense adequate
medications for palliative care, and despite the Supreme Court's deci-
sions strongly supporting the right of terminally ill patients to have
adequate medication for the relief of pain, physicians and pharmacists
will continue to be wary of the potential regulatory and criminal pit-
149. See American Pharmaceutical Association, supra note 127, at §11.
150. "Unprofessional conduct" is generally a basis in state law for professional discipline
of pharmacists. See ABOOD & BRUSHWOOD, supra note 43, at 175.
151. See Allen & Brushwood, supra note 18, at 15 ("The setting in which pharmacy is
typically practiced, however, may raise some legitimate apprehensions on the part of per-
sons attempting to acquire a prescription for pharmaceutically assisted death.").
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falls of prescribing such medication caused by state and federal con-
trolled substances legislation.
If terminally ill patients are to receive the medications they need
so that they may die peacefully, without preventable suffering, courts,
legislatures, and administrative agencies will need to give pharmacists
as well as physicians sufficient latitude to practice their professions in
accordance with the intent of the palliative care statutes and the
Supreme Court decisions.
